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1. Introduction
In his reaction to my article “State and Religion Against the Backdrop of  Religious 
Radicalism”, Philip Ryan makes two interrelated claims. First, he states that the mul-
ticultural state is a more attractive ideal to strive for than the religiously neutral state 
in the way I have developed this model. Second, the total submission of  bureaucrats to 
the democratically legitimized politicians can have adverse effects. It can lead to a sort 
of  dictatorship (in Ryan’s words: “religiously neutral electoral tyranny”1).
Despite our differences, there is still some common ground. Ryan and I see the con-
temporary debate as focusing on the two models of  multiculturalism and secularism, 
or the multicultural state and the secular state (or religiously neutral state). The clash 
between these two models is an important political conflict of  our time.2 The differ-
ence between us is that Ryan chooses the multicultural state, while I think that the 
secular state is a better alternative. In my view, France is more just than Canada or 
Great Britain. Multiculturalism—despite having good press in some circles—is unjust 
and untenable in the long run, in a situation where people have to live together under 
general laws in societies with religious and ideological diversity. Multiculturalism is 
now being abandoned in Europe and—so I have learned from Ryan—also in Canada. 
This, in my view, is a good development. But it is also inevitable.
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1 Phil Ryan, The Multicultural State and the Religiously Neutral State: A  Reply to Paul Cliteur, 12(2) Int’l 
J. Const. l. 457, 457–463 (2014).
2 The other three models, namely political atheism, state church, and theocracy (see Paul Cliteur, State 
and Religion Against the Backdrop of  Religious Radicalism, 10(1) Int’l J. Const. l. 127 (2012)) are obsolete, 
although, unfortunately, the European Court of  Human Rights in Strasbourg has voted for the placement 
of  the crucifix in public schools under the pretext that this has become a national symbol, considered to 
be more or less “religiously neutral.” See Lautsi and others v. Italy, Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., 18 March 2011. 
With this verdict, the European Court has violated the rights of  nonbelievers and non-Christian believers.
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But there is another thing that Ryan and I have in common. He understands the 
logic of  my view perfectly. My preference for the model of  the religiously neutral state 
logically leads to the rejection of  civil servants making religious, political, and ideo-
logical statements. Civil servants functioning in a democracy have to support the basis 
of  the system, which is: subservience to the democratic forces (and thereby, ultimately, 
to the citizens; to us).3
The two points are connected, of  course: a choice of  the religiously neutral state (or 
the secular state) leads to the subservience of  the civil service and the bureaucracy to 
political powers. The secular state and the democratic state are intimately linked. Let 
me now try to elaborate on the two points where Ryan and I part ways.
2. Which state is more just: the secular or the 
multicultural state?
First, let me address the question of  which model is superior: (i) the multicultural 
or (ii) the secular state. Ryan tries to adduce some areas in which the multicultural 
state seems to have some advantages over the secular state. He makes the argument 
that giving financial support to religions (to churches or social organizations linked 
to churches) makes it easier to control the content of  what is being preached from 
the pulpit. This would be handy in the case of  the sort of  religious extremism that is 
supported by Saudi petro-dollars.4 If  hundreds of  American mosques are under the 
control of  Saudi Arabian money, why not make them less dependent on this dubious 
source of  income by having the state finance these mosques? And, consequently, have 
a say in the content of  the sermons? My answer would be that we do not have to pay in 
order to exert influence. Those mosques can be controlled by all kinds of  means. In the 
Netherlands, the secret service monitors, and if  necessary controls, what is preached 
in the mosques; journalists make critical TV programs about so-called “hate imams”; 
and the general public (including people with a Muslim background) pay attention 
to this matter as well. There is no need to pay to exert influence.5 Besides, paying for 
the mosques (and subsequently for all religions, one may presume) will drag the state 
into an endless debate about which religions deserve state support and which do not. 
Should we finance only the “dangerous religions” (religions with a tendency towards 
extremism), as would be the implication of  Ryan’s suggestion?6 Or also pagan rites, 
witchcraft, and moderate churches? The problem is: it’s simply unfair (a violation of  
the principle of  equal treatment) to pay only for religions that cause problems. Besides, 
3 Fortunately, this system is confirmed in European case law in, e.g., Ahmed v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
8160/78, Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., Mar. 12, 1998.
4 Which is certainly a matter of  grave concern. Apart from the sources that Ryan mentions, see Karen 
ellIott House, on saudI arabIa: Its PeoPle, Past, relIgIon, Fault lInes—and Future (2013).
5 In 2010, the Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre indicated he would not allow Saudi Arabia 
to finance or build any mosques in Norway because of  the laws in Saudi Arabia that deny basic religious 
freedoms.
6 Ryan, supra note 1, 458.
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would that not put a premium on being extreme (terrorism pays, so to speak)?7 So, 
public funding—although meant as a contribution to get us out of  the quagmire—
may prove to be counterproductive.
Ryan also says that it is unlikely that policies that block foreign religious influence 
would ever be applied in a religiously neutral way. Why? I don’t see why this is neces-
sarily the case. It is perfectly possible (and morally legitimate) to block foreign religious 
indoctrination and influence if  it undermines the security of  the state or the security 
of  the citizens. And, of  course, Salafists will try to intimidate the state with the argu-
ment that the state frustrates their freedom of  religion. But in my view, we should 
not be impressed. Of  course, the choice of  national security over religious liberty for 
Salafists is a political and moral choice. In that sense, it is not “neutral” in the political 
or moral sense, but it is religiously neutral (which was the promise of  the religiously 
neutral state to begin with). Let me remind the reader: the religiously neutral state 
is not against moral and political choices. The religiously neutral state is a political 
choice itself. The first amendment to the American constitution is a political choice, 
but that does not undermine its religious neutrality (and the same is true of  the French 
laïcité).8
3. The subservience of  bureaucracy to democracy
The second major point where Ryan and I differ is the political subservience of  the civil 
service to the state. I support it. Ryan thinks he can adduce arguments that make that 
ideal obsolete or even dangerous.
Here Ryan refers to the example of  Creon and Antigone. I think Ryan mixes up two 
discussions: the discussion on civil disobedience and the debate on the subservience of  
the civil service. Of  course, there are things no political leader may do. Even if  Hitler 
had been democratically elected, his policies towards the Jews would remain crimes 
against humanity. Whether Creon’s command to Antigone not to bury her brother 
is sufficiently dictatorial to legitimate her disobeying his commands is difficult to 
ascertain. But, anyhow, this is not the relationship between a democratic state and 
its civil servants. So Ryan’s quote from Sophocles’ The Theban Plays misses the point. 
A better example to undermine the idea of  bureaucratic subservience would be Adolf  
Eichmann. In fact it was the Eichmann case and the Milgram experiment that stimu-
lated a widespread distrust towards bureaucratic subservience to the elected officials 
in democracies (in Ryan’s words, subservience is “profoundly dangerous . . . for all of  
us”9). It has led to a postmodern anarchism of  Foucault, dismissing all “control” or, as 
he says, “discipline,” and discrediting all kinds of  government (whatever its nature).10 
7 alan dersHowItz, wHy terrorIsm worKs: understandIng tHe tHreat, resPondIng to tHe CHallenge (2002).
8 A concise introduction is CommIssIon stasI, laïCIté et réPublIque, raPPort au PrésIdent de la réPublIque 
(2004). In publications on laïcité, it is stressed again and again that laïcité does not pretend to be politi-
cally neutral, but only religiously neutral. And yet critics keep arguing against “neutrality” as such.
9 Ryan, supra note 1, at 461.
10 Ryan refers to Michel Foucault in a laudatory sense (see id. at 458). I would not do that, of  course.
The multicultural state and the religiously neutral state: A rejoinder to Phil Ryan 467
This led to the misguided idea that: “Bureaucrats must resist . . . pressure from elected 
officials to direct decisions in favor of  political allies and funders,” as Ryan writes.11 Of  
course, everyone has to act morally in this world. Bureaucrats and elected officials are 
no exception. But it would certainly be wrong to think that the primary danger lies 
with the elected officials. If  power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely, 
the danger of  abuse of  power also looms with the bureaucrats. They have to be con-
trolled as well. And I do not think it is a sensible approach to think that they are the 
guardians of  democratic probity. It is also wrong to think that bureaucrats have the 
primary responsibility of  controlling the elected officials (and thereby “us,” “we the 
people”). The task of  controlling the elected officials is in the hands of  the representa-
tive. Bureaucratic subordination is not “extreme,” as Ryan writes,12 but it is the ordi-
nary logic of  the democratic process. It is not Weber or Finer who are “extreme,” but 
Foucault. It is an “extreme” idea to reject all discipline. Discipline (and punishment, 
Foucault’s other bête noire) has to be checked, but democracy is the most viable proce-
dure mankind has developed to effectuate this. It is not perfect—as nothing is under 
the sun. But it is better than the postmodern rejection of  all discipline. This makes 
us ripe for anarchy and totalitarian experiments, such as the Iranian revolution—of  
which Foucault was such an adamant supporter.13
11 Id. at 461.
12 Id. at 462.
13 Janet aFary & KevIn b. anderson, FouCault and tHe IranIan revolutIon: gender and tHe seduCtIons oF IslamIsm 
(2005).
